When courts speak in riddles, confusion becomes the verdict  

YESTERDAY’S Court of Appeal ruling in Morgan Ngona vs Miles Sampa is a reminder that justice must not only be done; it must also be understood.

Courts do not write only for lawyers. They write for citizens, political actors, public institutions, and history.

When a judgement is capable of being presented to the public as meaning something it does not say, the judiciary has a duty to speak with greater clarity.

In this matter, Mr Ng’ona, suing as a member and secretary general of the Patriotic Front, sought an interim injunction pending appeal.

He wanted the Court of Appeal to restrain Mr Sampa from interfering with his functions as secretary general and from altering party records at the Registrar of Societies.

The Court, however, did not determine whether Mr Sampa had the power to remove Mr Ng’ona. It did not pronounce Mr Sampa as the lawful President of the Patriotic Front. It did not decide the internal leadership dispute.

It dismissed the application on a procedural ground: that the application for an injunction pending appeal should first have been made in the High Court before being renewed in the Court of Appeal.

Yet, outside the courtroom, the ruling is now being interpreted as a substantive victory for MrSampa.

The respondent is suggesting that the decision confirms his authority as PF President, including the power to fire Mr Ng’ona. That is not what the ruling says.

The court merely held that Mr Ng’ona’s application was incompetently before it because he had not first approached the High Court. The ex parte injunction was discharged, yes, but that discharge does not amount to a judicial endorsement of Mr Sampa’s presidency or disciplinary powers.

This is where the problem lies. When courts dispose of politically sensitive disputes on technical grounds, they must be careful to state, in plain and unmistakable language, what they have decided and what they have not decided.

A simple paragraph could have prevented the present confusion: “For the avoidance of doubt, this court has not determined the legitimacy of either party’s claim to office, nor has it ruled on the respondent’s authority to remove the appellant.”

Such clarity would protect the public from propaganda masquerading as legal interpretation.

The ordinary citizen does not live inside procedural law. He does not instinctively understand the difference between dismissal of an application and determination of the substantive dispute. To many people, “application dismissed” sounds like “case lost.” In political litigation, that gap between legal meaning and public understanding can be exploited.

The judiciary must therefore become more deliberate in its language. Technical accuracy is not enough.

Judgements must also be publicly intelligible, especially where political rights, party leadership, and public institutions are involved. Ambiguity does not serve justice; it feeds manipulation.

This ruling may be correct in law. But its public effect has been confusion. And where confusion follows a judgement, the judiciary must ask itself whether it has spoken clearly enough. Courts are not political referees, but when their decisions enter political space, they must ensure that no party walks away wearing a crown the court never placed on his head.